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Abstract 
 
Recent price surge in commodity markets has stipulated the intensity of various factors which 
lead the price volatility.  There are multiple-factors namely, traditional supply and demand, 
excess global liquidity (i.e., monetary inflows in commodity markets), and financialization i.e., 
financial investors (portfolio investment and speculation) attitude.  This paper is an attempt to 
investigate for the evidence and impact of speculation on volatility of commodity prices in Indian 
commodity markets. And, results exhibit that speculation has played decisive role in the 
commodity price bubble during the global crisis in India.  
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An evidence of speculation in Indian commodity markets 
Vijay Kumar Varadi
1 
There are two primacy says we make money trading, catching a big price move with a small 
position or having a large position and catching a small move.  
-Bill Meehan 
 
1. Introduction: 
 
Global commodity markets have experienced significant price swings in recent years. Following 
a prolonged rise that peaked in mid 2008, led by soaring crude oil prices, global commodity 
markets fell sharply and bottomed out in early 2009. Since then, prices have been rising again, 
with the speed of the rise accelerating since the fall of 2010 (Bank of Japan, 2011). Global 
academia have found, the following factors for high and volatile commodity prices including a) 
traditional demand and supply factors, b) monetary factors; and finally financialization of 
commodity markets
2
 (including speculation, particularly by institutional investors such as hedge 
funds, pension funds and investment banks and other exchange traded funds and notes).  
 
Recently, commodities have been treated as an “asset class3” because it would develop a vibrant, 
active and liquid commodity market and help investors hedge their commodity risk, take 
speculative positions in commodities and exploit arbitrage opportunities in the market. A few 
characteristics including a) Liquidity transmission into commodity assets, b) Volatile stock 
market – “commodity markets are investors‟ heaven”, c) Low interest rates in the host nations; 
and d) Hedge against weak dollar are major influential factors caused for investors to treat 
commodity markets as a “asset class”. 
 
The transformation of commodities (commodity derivatives) into financial assets is often blamed 
for the instability of commodity prices. A new breed of market participants are demanding 
commodities only on paper including  institutional investors, pension funds, endowments and 
other corporate investors.  Commodity index investment is an activity typically characterized by 
                                                 
1
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 The financialization of commodity trading has increasingly jeopardized this function of commodity exchanges. 
Financial investors in commodity markets base their position-taking on risk and return considerations for which 
information about other asset markets and the overall economy play a key role, as do financial motives more 
generally. Such trading behavior, while relying on similar types of information, also anticipates the price impact of 
that information in similar ways. Taken together, the financialization of commodity trading poses the risk of herd 
behavior and of self-fulfilling prophecy due to the pecuniary power of these market participants. 
3
 A group of securities that exhibit similar characteristics, behave similarly in the marketplace, and are subject to the 
same laws and regulations. Asset classes and asset class categories are often mixed together. These investment 
vehicles are asset class categories, and are used for diversification purposes. It should be noted that in addition to the 
three main asset classes, some investment professionals would add real estate and commodities, and possibly other 
types of investments, to the asset class mix.  
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a passive strategy designed to gain exposure to commodity price movements as part of portfolio 
diversification strategy. Investors have seen portfolio diversification advantages in adding a 
proportion of commodity futures to equity and bond portfolios i.e., obtaining a higher return for 
the same level of risk – Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006). The index investors engaged in 
commodity markets include index funds, swap dealers, pension funds, hedge funds and mutual 
funds that have a fiduciary or other obligation to track the value of similar commodity or basket 
of commodities in an essentially proactive manner. Index Investment in commodity markets has 
a tendency to increase speculative activity in futures markets, leads to large percentage of market 
place has no intent of taking futures to delivery, causing price volatility and commodity markets 
have started setting price of commodities as an asset, which may offer a possible explanation 
through sunspot equilibrium
4
. In this scenario, the objective of the paper is to examine whether 
Indian commodity markets do have any significant role of institutional investors/speculators by 
employing three possible explanations.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides some background information about 
commodities and commodity indices. Section II documents the role of speculation in commodity 
markets. We discuss Indian commodity markets and its regulatory reforms in Section III, and an 
extensive review on financialization of commodity markets has been done in Section IV, and 
objectives, data and proxies for financialization in commodity markets and results have been 
discussed in Section V, and finally Section VI concludes the paper.   
 
2. The role of speculation in commodity markets: 
 
Recent global financial and food crisis is evidenced and realized the assumptions of speculation 
trading. Speculators
5
 are trend-spotters. The concern is that trend spotting creates the trends that 
are subsequently identified. J.M. Keynes and J.R. Hicks are well known for the “theory of risk-
transfer hypothesis”6. Major distinction between hedgers (“commercials”7) and speculators 
(“non-commercials”8) is that speculators are relatively risk-tolerant individuals who are rewarded 
for accepting price risks from risk-averse “hedgers”. Speculators in the forwards or futures 
                                                 
4
 Uncertainty about the economic fundamental is intrinsic uncertainty.  Market uncertainty is not transmitted through 
the fundamentals; it can be driven by extrinsic uncertainty. „Sunspots‟ is short-hand for „the extrinsic random 
variable‟ upon which agents coordinate their decision. In proper sunspot equilibrium, the allocation of resources 
depends in a non-trivial way on sunspots. Sunspot models are complete rational-expectations; general-equilibrium 
models offer an explanation of excess volatility. 
5
 Speculators can be classified as scalpers, day traders, or position traders. A person who trades derivatives, 
commodities, bonds, equities or currencies with a higher-than-average risk in return for a higher-than average profit 
potential. Speculators take large risks, especially with respect to anticipating future price movements, in the hope of 
making quick, large gains. Scalpers are watching for very short-term trends and attempt to profit from small 
changes in the contract price. They usually hold their position for only a few minutes.  Day traders hold their 
positions for less than one trading day.  They are unwilling to take the risk that adverse news will occur overnight.  
Position traders hold their positions of much longer periods of time. 
6
 J.M Keynes (1930) V.2, Chapter 29 and Hicks (1946), PP. 137-139 
7
 An investment in a commodity index, involved in the buying and/or selling of goods and/or services that is 
expected to generate cash flow. A commercial investment can be assumed by an individual, group or institution. 
Frequently, a commercial investment is shared by a group of investors combining assets in order to fund the 
investment. A commercial investment arise where an investor commits money or capital to purchase, either entirely 
or a percentage of, a for-profit property or business. 
8
 A classification used by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to identify traders that use the 
futures market for speculative purposes.  
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markets may be on the long or on short side of any single such transaction, but in aggregate their 
commitments must offset any net imbalance of the long and short hedger‟s positions. An 
common view of speculation is ordinarily understood to mean the purchase of a good for later re-
sale rather than for use, on the temporary sale of a good with the intention of later re-purchase – 
in the hope of profiting from an intervening price change
9
, which is having the following 
fundamentals and idealizing assumptions includes a) speculation occurs only in “informative 
situations”, b) in informative situations individuals must adjust both to “price risk” and “quantity 
risk”, c) in an informative situation there are two inter-related market equilibrium; and d) 
speculative behaviour is conditioned upon the scope of markets. 
 
Speculation in commodity derivatives markets performs a valuable economic function. Firstly, 
speculation in these markets allows for the transfer of price risk from those least willing to bear it 
(commodity producers and consumers, or „end users‟) to those with the greatest appetite and 
capacity to do so (generically, „speculators‟).  Secondly, derivatives markets transmit valuable 
information about supply and demand conditions.  In recent times, increased amounts of capital 
have been flowing into the commodity futures trade, and there is thus a need to analyze the role 
futures market participants can possibly play in forming or distorting prices in the market for the 
underlying commodity
10
. Increasing speculative activity in futures markets i.e., large percentage 
of market place has no intent of taking futures to delivery, causing price volatility, commodity 
markets have started setting price of commodities as an asset.  Therefore speculators can create a 
price distortion and speculative bubble with anticipating making significant profits form major 
movements in the markets
11
. Persistent inflationary pressures in global commodity prices in the 
recent past has sparked a debate over its nature with speculation in commodity markets being 
singled out as the primary factor behind rising prices, even leading to a demand for a ban on 
futures trading for several important commodities.  
 
Index investments are different form traditional speculative positions in three respects, such as a) 
traditional speculators can be long or short positions.  Index investors are almost invariably long, 
b) traditional speculators hold for short periods.  Index investors hold over long periods and roll 
positions forward at contract maturity; and c) traditional speculators pick markets (details, see 
table 1 in Annexure).  Index investors track specific indices rather than taking positions on 
specific markets. They can also be large (up to 30-40% of total interest) in relation to the overall 
market. Now the question is whether speculators (traditional or dynamic) can influence 
movements in commodity prices, if so, whether they have created any distortion and bubble in 
Indian commodity markets. A more appropriate characterization of this debate is the scope for 
commodity markets to be affected by destabilizing speculation. The present analysis shed some 
light to provide empirical evidence for the above. 
 
3. Indian Commodity Markets: 
 
The commodity futures market in India dates back to more than a century.  The first organized 
futures market was established in 1875, under the name and style of 'Bombay Cotton Trade 
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 J. Hirshleiper (1977), “The theory of Speculation under alternative regimes of markets” 
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 Shushimita Bose (2009), “The role of futures market in aggravating commodity price inflation and the future of 
commodity futures in India”. 
11
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4 
 
Association' to trade in cotton derivative contracts. The mechanism of forward trading has 
actually developed and advanced considerably in the major trading nations of the world, like 
USA, UK, France, Japan, etc.  In these countries, forward trading has been permitted in many 
new items/services including financial futures, shipping freights and interest rates etc.  In 
comparison, commodity futures markets in India are much simpler and are at present dealing in 
single futures contracts in commodities. The forward contracts in commodities ensures that the 
manufacturers, processors, or producers to get continuous supply of the raw materials.   
 
In 1952, Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, (FCT Act) was enacted to regulate the commodity 
futures market and Forward Market Commission (FMC) was set up as a commodity futures 
market regulator in 1953. FMC performs the flow of approving the rules and regulations of the 
exchange subject to which the trading is to conducted, accord permission for commencement of 
trading in different contracts, monitor market conditions continuously and take remedial 
measures whenever the trading tends to go outside the permissible limits. The system of 
regulation of the commodity futures markets contributes to the overall objectives of ensuring an 
efficient market, reducing information asymmetry and promoting confidence in the market. The 
regulations aimed at the prevention of market manipulation focus on maintaining the integrity of 
the market price of commodities. 
 
The apprehension in the minds of policy makers about deleterious effects of speculation in the 
commodity futures, futures markets were prohibited in most of the commodities, which 
continued for about 3 decades. With reference to various committee reports such as Kabra 
(1994), World Bank and UNCTAD report (1996) India revived the futures trading and allowed 
national level commodity exchanges to set up. Three National level exchanges i.e., NMCE (Jan, 
2003), MCX (Sep, 2003) and NCDEX (Nov, 2003) were granted recognition for commodity 
futures trading with demoralized and corporative (online electronic trading).  At present 113 
commodities are notified in 21 exchanges for futures trading and actual trading is taking place in 
about 50 commodities. The value of trading which was just Rs. 66 thousand crores in 2002-03 
increased to Rs.119.49 lakh crores in 2010-11 i.e., 181% increase during the period.  
 
4. Literature Review: 
 
The empirical evidence on this subject has been mixed. Sanders, Irwin, and Merrin (2008) 
expressed skepticism about the assertion that speculation has led to bubbles in agricultural 
futures prices. Other authors share somewhat different views. Robles and others (2009) identified 
speculative activity in the futures market as a source of the 2007/08 agricultural commodity price 
increases. Plastina (2008) concluded that between January 2006 and February 2008, investment 
fund activity might have pushed cotton prices 14 percent higher than they would otherwise have 
been. In the non-ferrous metals market, Gilbert (2007) found no direct evidence of the impact of 
investor activity on the prices of metals, but found strong evidence that the futures positions of 
index providers had affected the prices of soybeans (though not of maize) in the US futures 
exchanges. Perhaps, the strongest evidence is a subsequent study by Gilbert (2010: 420) who 
concluded that “By investing across the entire range of commodity futures, index based investors 
appear to have inflated food commodity prices.” 
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The increase in long speculative positions was surpassed by an increase in short hedging in 
commodity markets (Sanders et al., 2008), long-only index trading which pushes prices up, 
irrespective of the market situation (Lines. T 2010), financial investment in commodity trading 
appears to have caused prices may deviate, at least in the short run (Mayer J 2009), index 
speculators frustrated the futures market (Van et al 2009), the recent wide fluctuations of 
commodity prices have been driven by the financialization of commodity markets (UNCTAD 
2009), speculators that invest in commodity markets determines commodity spot prices and 
commodity futures risk premia in equilibrium (VV Acharya, 2010), consistent with speculation 
affecting prices, and show that index-based investment has a significant and persistent price 
impact (Gilbert 2008), speculative price spikes built up, and the gap between spot and futures 
prices widened, causing to halt grain futures trading (Miguel Robles 2009), speculative buying 
by index funds in commodity futures and over–the–counter derivatives markets created a 
„„bubble‟‟ in commodity prices (S. H. Irwin 2009), speculation has driven prices up to current 
levels (Davidson 2008),  speculation on food prices has played the decisive role in the  price 
bubble in 2007/2008 (Peter Wahl , 2008),  speculation was a major force that pushed commodity 
prices up during 2003-2008 (Jeffrey A. Frankel 2008), financial investors (the so-called 
”financialization of commodities”) may have been partly responsible for the 2007/08 spike (John 
Baffes et al 2010), financial speculation in commodities futures markets is the real culprit (L. 
Randall Wray 2009 and 2010), speculators on futures markets played a minor impact on prices, 
but exuberant expectations of all market participants had an influence (Rolf Kappel, 2010) the oil 
price  spike was a speculative bubble driven by financial flows requires neither disapproval of 
purely financial investments in oil nor a judgment about motives (John E. Parsons 2009), 
financial regulators turn their attention to financial markets in agricultural commodities, which 
show signs of the speculation and overshooting have resulted crises in global finance (Sandra 
Polaski 2008), the grains and oilseeds sector corn, the soybean sub-sector and the wheat  sub-
sector all exhibited speculative bubbles in US (Peter Went 2009), as speculative hoarding takes 
place, the price of commodities jumps (Ricardo caballero, 2008), the role of speculation in 
commodity price volatility is a highly contentious (Cyn-Young, 2006), price deviations between 
futures and spot markets, rational and informed speculators are seen to drive any price deviations 
in the market quickly (Susan Newman, 2009), speculative activity tends to respond to price 
movements suggesting that the causality runs from prices to changes in speculative positions 
(Thomas Helbling, 2008). There is a consensus and evidence of financialization (speculation) in 
commodity markets and which is being a real culprit for the recent price surge during the 
financial and food crisis. In this scenario this paper tries to examine whether Indian commodity 
markets have any significant impact by institutional investors. 
 
5. Objectives and Results of the Study: 
This paper made an effort to investigate the speculation in commodity prices, which would be of 
interest to the investors, commodity exchanges and policy makers and regulators etc.; further this 
study provides useful insight for the market activity with respect to price volatility. Objectives of 
the study includes, to investigate the impact of speculation on commodity markets in India, and 
to elucidate relationship between investor‟s behaviour and financialization in commodity 
markets. The hypotheses formulation is as under: Speculators have not significantly influenced 
the commodity markets in India in recent period and liquidity of capital inflows (value of trade) 
does not cause price volatility in commodity markets. Data is collected form the FMC (forward 
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markets commission) – fortnightly data is aggregated as monthly series for MCX (Multi-
Commodity Exchange), NCDEX (National Commodity & Derivative Exchange Ltd.,), and 
NMCEX (National Multi-Commodity Exchange Ltd.,).  These markets are performing 
significantly huge volume and value of trade in the national commodity markets.  We have 
aggregated all the above markets data such as Trading Volume, Open Interest and Near Month 
Contracts. Data employed in this study is from April 2006 to December 2010 (Monthly Data) 
time series data. Spot and Futures commodity index prices have been collected from the MCX, 
NSE. 
There are three possible explanations to establish the evidence of speculation in commodity 
markets. First, finding outliers in the study using three proxies such as volume of traded 
contracts, capital flows in the commodity markets i.e., value of trade and open interest are 
considered. A possible explanation for being outlier in any month is the actual trade, turnover 
and open interest is higher than the average of its actual, then those observation respective 
months are considered as a potential speculative months in the commodity markets. Second, the 
volatility spillovers between cross-markets i.e., if the risk increases in any asset, the potential 
investment would reduce and it yields lesser returns or even negative, in order to avoid such 
idiosyncratic risks, investors may search for the alternative assets, which yields more or less the 
same returns. In academia recently it is found that commodity markets are treated as “safe 
heaven for assets”, in this paper an attempt has been made to find the volatility spillovers 
between assets i.e., equities and commodities. Finally, third explanation is based on basis, 
contango and backwardation
12
, the shape of the futures curve is an important indicator for the 
hedgers and speculators or price discovery analysis.  
Speculators in the futures markets may be on the long and short side of any single such 
transaction, but in the aggregate their commitments must offset any net imbalances in the long 
and short hedger‟s position13.  This analysis of the role of financial speculation in the behaviour 
in the recent years focuses on trading activities. For the analysis, we have taken aggregate data 
from FMC.  To capture the size of the change in speculative behaviour, we analyze the following 
indicators, including a) Volume of Futures Contracts
14
 (Trading Volume), b) Value of the 
Contracts
15
 (Trading Value), c) Open Interest in futures contracts
16
 (OI, All Contracts in 
Commodity markets). 
                                                 
12
 Basis is the difference between the spot price and the futures price at a given time, t. Contango is a condition 
where forward prices exceed spot prices, so the forward curve is upward sloping. Backwardation is the opposite 
condition, where spot prices exceed forward prices, and the forward curve slopes downward.  
13
 Robels et.al (2009), “Why speculation Matters”,  
14
  Monthly volume of futures contracts: this indicator captures the total number of trades in commodity futures 
contracts in MCX, NCDEX, and NMCEX on monthly basis, aggregating contracts with different maturities.  
Typically, contracts with maturities of 24 months or less are traded.  Volume represents the total amount of trading 
activity or contracts that have changed hands in a given commodity market. The greater the amount of trading 
during a market session the higher will be the trading volume. It also represents a measure of intensity or pressure 
behind a price trend. The greater the volume, the more we can expect the existing trend to continue rather than 
reverse.  
15
 Monthly value of futures contracts: This is an indicator for the liquidity of funds inflows in the commodity 
markets. Price is the most important factor which influences the trader‟s activity.  
16
 Monthly open interest in futures contracts: Open interest describes the total number of futures contracts in the 
markets that have not yet been offset by the opposite futures position or fulfilled by delivery of the commodity.  
Every time a trader takes a position in the futures market (either long or short), it immediately generates an open 
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Masters and White (2008)
17
 recommended specific regulatory steps to address the alleged 
problems created by index fund investment in commodity futures markets, including the re-
establishment of speculative position limits for all speculators in all commodity futures markets 
and the elimination or severe restriction of index speculation. Figure 1 shows, during the global 
financial and food crisis, there are bubbles in traded volume and investment inflows in the 
commodity markets which are above the average trade, and there are few huge bubbles in the 
period of staring 2010 and it would have a recursive carry forward effect for the further. This 
explains that, speculators may have influenced the market with their short positions and made 
investments in long positions. During recent global crisis, the bubble size of trade is 14,00,0000 
thousands of metric tonnes, which is 5-8 times greater than the average trade, similarly value of 
trade is also increased suddenly from 300 thousands crores to 900 thousands crores which again 
4-5 times greater than the average value of trade. This is explained by Petzels (2009)
18
 through 
his testimony at a CFTC hearing on position limits in energy futures markets, “Seasoned 
observers of commodity markets know that as non-commercial participants enter a market, the 
opposite side is usually taken by a short-term liquidity provider, but the ultimate counterparty is 
likely to be a commercial.  In the case of commodity index buyers, evidence suggests that the 
sellers are not typically other investors or leveraged speculators. Instead, they are owners of the 
physical commodity who are willing to sell into the futures market and either deliver at 
expiration or roll their hedge forward if the spread allows them to profit from continued storage. 
This activity is effectively creating “synthetic” long positions in the commodity for the index 
investor, matched against real investors held by the shorts.  We have seen high spot prices along 
with large inventories and strong positive carry relationships as a result of the expanded index 
activity over the last few years”. 
Figure 1: Volume and Value of Trade
19
 (April 2006 – March 2010) 
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position until this trader takes the opposite position or the contract expires.  Where volume measures the pressure or 
intensity behind a price trend, open interest measures the flow of money into the futures market.   
17
 Masters, M.W and A.K. White (2008), “The accidental hunt brothers: How institutional investors are driving up 
food and energy prices” 
18
 Petzel, T (2009), “Testimony before the CFTC”, July 28.    
19
 GOI ordered to delist of futures contract in Feb 2007 for commodities like urad, tur, wheat and rice with a 
suspeciation that futures trading in these commodities had been contributing to the rise in their domestic prices. In 
figure, we have shown the far-month contracts that mean the contacts are before February 2007.  
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Theoretical models that show uninformed or noise traders impacting market prices rely on the 
unpredictable trading patterns of these traders to make arbitrage risky.  Because the arbitrage – 
needed to drive prices to fundamental value – is not risk less, noise traders can drive a wedge 
between market prices and fundamental values.  Working (1960)
20
  argued that speculation must 
be gauged relative to hedging needs.  In particular, speculation can only be considered 
“excessive” relative to the level of hedging activity.  
Figure 2: Volume of Trade 
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As shown in Fig 2, for Volume of Trade in mid-2007 thorough mid-2008 – where it is evidence 
appears to be a close correspondence between index trader positions (long positions) and global 
financial crisis. Further mid-2009 provides significance of long positions (i.e., index trader 
positions, passive, large and long-only positions in swap agreements with banks, which in turn 
hold futures contracts to offset their short positions, able to benefit only in rising or 
backwardated markets; transparent positions) in Indian commodity markets.  Active, large 
positions can improve liquidity and make hedging easier for large commercial users.  In periods 
of rapid and sharp price changes, large positions are a “liquidity sponge”, making it difficult for 
hedgers with commercial interests to place orders. This is evident from figure 2. The ratio of 
volume to open interest also captures speculative market activity, under the assumption that the 
majority of speculators prefer to involve in a short period of time, Hence a speculator taking 
opposite positions (buying and selling contracts) in the market within days or weeks will 
generate an increase in monthly registered volumes but little change in monthly open interest.  
 
 
First, let Monthly Value of Trade =A, Monthly Volume of Traded contracts = B and Monthly 
open interest in commodity markets in India =C. Let‟s suppose the speculation might have 
occurs in the following:  
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 Working H (1960), “Speculation on Hedging Markets”, Food Research Institute studies, 1:185-220 
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
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
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),(1
),(0
   (1) 
 
Speculative Activity in B  





BifBYes
BifBNo
),(1
),(0
   (2) 
 
Speculative Activity in C  





CifCYes
CifCNo
),(1
),(0
   (3) 
 
 
Table 1: Occurrences of Speculative Activity in commodity markets 
 
 a) Value of Trade b) Volume of Trade c) Open Interest 
Assumptions If a>= mean(a), then 
Yes; otherwise No 
If b>= mean(b), 
then Yes, otherwise 
No 
If c>= mean (c), 
then Yes, otherwise 
No  
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Actual Occurrences 20 28 18 30 17 31 
% of Chance of 
Occurrences 
41.67% 58.33% 37.5% 62.5% 35.41% 64.58% 
Odds Ratio
21
 1.015 1.023 1.028 
Total No. of Months 
estimated 
48(100%) 48(100%) 48(100%) 
Source: Author’s estimations 
 
Table 1 depicts that, the total occurrences that the actual values greater than and equal to mean of 
the actual is significantly high i.e., in value of trade is 20 (41.67%), total number of contracts 
traded  in commodity markets are 18 (37.5%) and the open interest which is a significant factor 
having 17 (35.41%).  The odds ratio (OR) is one of a range of statistics used to assess the risk of 
a particular outcome (or Speculation in commodity markets) if a certain factor (A, B and C are 
greater than or equal to mean (A, B, C) respectively) is present. The odds ratio is a versatile and 
robust statistic. The OR measures the ratio of the odds that an event or result will occur to the 
odds of the event not happening. We have measured the ratio of the odds of a speculative activity 
occurring or a common trade from three indicators. The odds ratio is a measure of effect size (as 
is the Pearson Correlation Coefficient) and therefore provides information on the strength of 
relationship between two variables The Odds ratio is greater than 1 in all the above indicators, 
indicates that the condition is more likely to occur in the speculative activity. 
 
Based on the above analysis, it is found about 17 months are having the common behavior in 
above three indicators. Three indicators performance according to the above method, we found 
17 out of 48 months are shown peculiar behavior in the commodity markets i.e., the speculative 
                                                 
21
 The odds ratio is the ratio of the odds of an event occurring in one group to the odds of it occurring in another 
group. The term is also used to refer to sample-based estimates of this ratio. These groups might be men and women, 
an experimental group and a control group, or any other dichotomous classification.  
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evidence based on various policies and initiatives by FMC and GoI. The government 
intervention or regulatory bodies by imposing margin on spread positions, banning few 
commodities from exchanges, policies to allow foreign investment in commodity exchanges and 
to trade in evening times, approval  to granting permission launching new contracts in 
commodities and new commodity exchanges, permission to accredit the warehouses of 
procurements,  extending to  hedge positions and to early delivery system, approval of transfer 
equity shares, revised open position limits etc., may drew attention of investors to play a 
significant role in commodity markets during the spikes of the months (see table 2 in annexure). 
 
Second, Volatility spillovers between cross markets, i.e., commodities and equity markets may 
improve the chances for speculators to shift their investments from one market to another. For 
this purpose, we have employed both MCX Commodity Spot Index and S&P CNX Nifty Index. 
By utilizing the bivariate GARCH model the following estimations are depicted. 
 
Table 2: Multivariate GARCH estimations between commodities and equities 
 
 Variable Coefficients Std Error T-Stat Significance 
1 Mean(1) 0.011 0.006 1.690 0.091 
2 Mean(2) 0.004 0.010 0.391 0.696 
3 C(1,1) -0.016 0.008 -2.084 0.037 
4 C(2,1) 0.053 0.010 5.295 0.000 
5 C(2,2) 0.000 -0.023 0.000 1.000 
6 A(1,1) 0.449 0.209 2.148 0.032 
7 A(1,2) -0.623 0.378 -1.646 0.100 
8 A(2,1) 0.109 0.096 1.133 0.257 
9 A(2,2) 0.522 0.257 2.033 0.042 
10 B(1,1) -0.771 0.191 -4.033 0.000 
11 B(1,2) -0.317 0.446 -0.711 0.477 
12 B(2,1) -0.338 0.121 -2.783 0.005 
13 B(2,2) 0.098 0.200 0.491 0.624 
  Source: Author‟s Estimations 
 
From the above table, we depict that, A&B matrix measures the cross market effects such as 
shock and volatility spillovers effects among the markets. Estimation results found that, there is 
bilateral shock and a volatility spillover exists between commodities and equity indices.  In 
particular B(2,1) with -0.33 focus are being main transmitters within the markets, indicates the 
level of volatility transmission.  Volatility transmission from Nifty to Commodity Spot is -
33.75% which implies that a 1% increase in returns of the S&P CNX Nifty index transmits about 
-33% volatility in commodity index.  There is a strong relationship between volatility and market 
performance. Modern portfolio theory (MPT) describes, volatility creates risk that is associated 
with the degree of dispersion of returns around the average i.e., the greater the chance of a lower-
than-expected return, the riskier the investment.  When volatility increases, risk increases and 
returns decrease. Hence, we can expect that the players in equity markets may have shifted to the 
equities to reduce their investment risks and increasing their returns from commodities, which 
may causes the speculative bubble in commodity markets. 
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Finally, over the last few years commodity prices have undergone strong fluctuations as a 
consequence of economic, political and financial issues that have reshaped the global economic 
equilibrium.  Most of the anomalies recorded during this period were attributed to the growing 
role played by financial instruments, specifically derivatives. In fact, although it is well known 
that derivatives  provide economic benefits, such as information dissemination, price discovery 
and efficient  allocation of resources (Chan 1992, Schwarz, Szakmary 1994), the tightened cross-
market linkages  that result from derivatives trading also fuel a common public and regulatory 
perception that  derivatives generate or exacerbate volatility in the underlying asset markets, 
since they represent not  only an important tool for managing risk exposure,  but also an 
opportunity for trading and  speculation. In particular, the low cost of futures trading may induce 
excessive speculation which, in turn, may cause commodity prices to vary excessively, with 
destabilizing effects in the markets.  Because inventories have been plentiful in the last couple of 
years (combined with weak demand due to a global recession), may commodities have traded in 
contango. Holding a long commodity position differs from holding a stock in that commodity 
futures have expiration dates and one must buy or “roll” into a new contract when their existing 
contract expires.  Contango is the “normal” or “cost of carry” upward curve shape of futures 
prices rising with time to maturity.  Backwardation is the downward curve shape when prices fall 
with time to maturity.    
 
Figure 3 provides the information about the markets behavior i.e. basis of commodity markets, in 
which we can found 12.22% of backwardation and 87.78% trades in contango. Contango refers 
to a condition in commodity futures markets where the forward price of a contract is greater than 
the current (spot) price – an upward sloping forward cure. The higher forward price is partially 
based on the “cost of carry” related to the underlying physical commodity (e.g., storage, 
insurance and security costs). For a passive commodity index investor, this condition can create a 
return headwind
22
. In contrast to a passive indexer, an intelligent index investor can employ a 
range of strategies to mitigate the impact of contango while also retaining the inherent benefit of 
diversification and inflation hedging that this asset class has traditionally provided
23
. As 
                                                 
22
 They are forced to sell low and buy high, which creates a negative “roll yield” when doing an ex-post return 
attribution on the index. 
23
 An intelligent index investor, on the other hand, may recognize the characteristics, and actually benefit from the 
totally passive indexers while disguising his own market actions.  He can roll from nearby to distinct contracts on 
Contango, 87.78% 
Backwardation, 12.22% 
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contango widens to record levels in many commodity markets, many investors have discovered 
the advantages of market neutral strategies that exploit the commodity indices out performance 
without taking a directional view on commodity price levels. Institutional investors have also 
looked to bespoke indices that apply index methodology to each underlying commodity within, 
say, the MCX commodity Index. At present, the arguments for and against commodity 
investments are complex. On one hand, rising inventories, falling industrial output and weak 
consumption have undercut prices. On the other, those very factors will discourage investment in 
exploration and production. In time, this is likely to aggravate the very supply bottlenecks that 
gave rise to the commodity super cycle of the past years.  
 
Cross autocorrelation (See figure 4) between spot and futures commodity markets provides the 
useful insights of information; in spot market the information has impact of 2 days lag and 
futures contains 3 day lag information, whereas futures does have information impact on spot 
markets about a week. Vector autoregressions are a concise way of summarizing data in which 
generally have little serial correlation in residuals and can be used to examine complex 
relationships among variables such as, information content in prices in different commodity 
indices i.e., spot and futures market prices with effects of arbitrage options. 
Table 3: VAR Estimations 
Variable Futures Price Returns Current (Spot) Price Returns 
C  0.000421 
 (0.00025) 
 0.000224 
(0.00021) 
FRT(-1) -0.020696 
(0.02663) 
 0.760164*** 
(0.02220) 
FRT(-2) -0.038541 
(0.03576) 
 0.538052*** 
(0.02981) 
SRT(-1)  0.071985** 
 (0.03174) 
-0.508280*** 
 (0.02646) 
SRT(-2)  0.049739 
(0.03552) 
-0.377665*** 
 (0.02961) 
Values in parenthesis are p-values, ** and *** indicates 5 and 1% level of significance 
  Source: Author‟s Estimations 
Table 3 depicts the relationship between the commodity spot and futures returns, and it is 
significant about 2 lags. Futures price returns have a positive impact on the current prices, where 
as spot prices returns have a significantly negative impact on futures prices, and also found the 
model is stationary based on inverse AR roots. It is also found, the long-run equilibrium 
relationship between spot and futures prices using conventional cointegration analysis, use a 
refined methodology to analyze the existence of a potential structural break in the cointegration 
vector in order to gather the time dynamic of the relationship, which is important in a period of 
high price movements. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
days other than those specified by the passive index. He can hold positions at points on the forward curve that are 
different from the index rules. He can hold his positions on exchanges other than those specified by the published 
index.  All of these strategies tend to prevent the intelligent index from being “arbed” by active market participants 
because he is action. 
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Table 4: VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Hypothesis Chi-square value p-value 
Futures index price returns  does not cause Spot returns 1069.399  0.0000 
Spot index price returns does not cause Futures Returns 7.312465  0.0258 
Source: Author’s Estimations 
And we also find empirical data highlight that there are bidirectional information flows between 
spot and futures markets. In line with Irwin et al.. (2009), it can be argued that demand and 
supply pressures over physical commodities are as important as trading on the futures market to 
increase the price discovery role of spot markets. This finding emphasizes the price discovery 
drivers for this commodity, more related to than financial trading patterns rather fundamental 
patterns on futures markets 
 
Figure 4: Cross Correlations and Impulse Reponses to VAR 
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The dynamic adjustment of reciprocal dependency is immediately not considerable. The impulse 
response test shows the effects of an exogenous shock on the whole process over time. 
Therefore, one can detect the dynamic relationships over time. The idea is, initially; look at the 
adjustment of the endogenous variables over time, after a hypothetical shock in it. This 
adjustment is compared with the time series process without a shock, i.e. the actual process. The 
impulse response sequences plot the difference between this two time paths. Figure 4 depicts the 
responses adjusts about 4 days information of spot and futures prices. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks: 
 
There is a widespread belief and assumption in commodity markets that especially after global 
financial crisis, the speculative activity has increased dramatically with involvement of exchange 
traded funds and active index investors in commodity markets. It is easy to agree that speculators 
affect price developments as they help in the discovery of future prices, which are important, but 
unknown fundamental variables, created bubble in commodity markets. As a result of too 
optimistic bets on certain maturity, the futures price set on an “incorrectly high level”, which 
would move the whole price curve due to arbitrage if stocks are high. Thus also the spot price 
would rise to an artificially high level if bets are on rising prices. Higher-than-fundamental prices 
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would induce inventory accumulation, although the very low price elasticity‟s of both supply and 
demand would diminish the smoothness of adjustment. 
 
What is the economic impact of the rapid growth of commodity index investment?  To address 
this question, it is important to recognize the concurrent economic transition of commodities 
markets precipitated by the rapid growth of commodity index investment (volatility spillovers 
between asset and commodities). The increased commodity price co movements reflect the 
financialization process precipitated by the rapid growth of commodity index investment. This 
process can have significant economic consequences on commodities markets. On one hand, the 
presence of commodity index investors can lead to a more efficient sharing of commodity price 
risk; on the other, their portfolio rebalancing can spill over price volatility from outside to 
commodities markets and also across different commodities. While the data sample after 2004 
may be too short to give a reliable measure of changes in commodity risk premia, it is sufficient 
for uncovering a significant volatility spillovers effect between commodity and equity markets 
since the investors treated commodities as an asset class and safe heaven for their investments. 
 
Empirical findings generally support the price discovery role of futures markets, i.e. spot prices 
are usually discovered in the future markets. Indeed, spot and futures prices on the same 
commodity have the same fundamentals and change if new information emerges that causes 
market participants to revise their estimates of physical supply and/or demand. Since contracts 
sold on futures markets generally do not require the delivery of the commodity but can be 
implemented immediately with little up-front cash, futures markets generally react more quickly 
than spot markets. Investors are assumed as intelligent investors, and recorded during this period 
were attributed to the growing role played by financial instruments, specifically derivatives. In 
fact, although it is well known that derivatives provide economic benefits, such as information 
dissemination, price discovery and efficient allocation of resources between spot and futures 
markets may also have additive effect for the investors to make more returns from index 
investments in commodities. 
  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no applied research on this subject in Indian commodity 
markets on speculative activity with which to further compare our findings.  This paper provides 
an evidence for “speculation” during the crisis period and which might be a cause for “excessive 
volatility” in commodity markets. As it shows, speculation can cause unreasonable or 
unwarranted price fluctuations.  Hence, the regulator or policy makers should take initiative steps 
in order to reduce the impact of excessive speculation in future.  The policy recommendations 
include a) Impose speculative position limits for the purpose of preventing “excessive 
speculation”. Monitor daily potential violations in the market, b) Implementation of CFTC 
(2010) [Dodd-Frank Act] for position reporting requirements for commodity futures contracts 
traded on or subject to designated contract markets (DCMs). The CFTC believes that the data 
generated from such reporting requirements are “reasonably necessary for implementing and 
enforcing aggregate position limits for certain physical commodity derivatives”, c) Surveillance 
of individual/institutional trader‟s activities and potential market power and enforces speculative 
position limits by using a  large trader reporting system (LTRS), d) Exercise the special call 
provision for preventing insider trading and prevent manipulation or abusive practices, e) Ban on 
high frequency trading in commodity markets.  
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Annexure I 
 
Table: Commodity futures trading behaviour: Traditional speculators, managed funds and 
index traders 
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 Traditional 
speculators 
Managed funds Index traders 
General 
Market 
position 
Active positions on 
both sides of the 
market; able to benefit 
in both rising and 
declining markets 
Active, often large, positions on 
both sides on market; able to 
benefit in both rising and 
declining markets; relatively 
opaque positions 
Passive, large and long-only 
positions in swap agreements 
with banks, which in turn hold 
futures contracts to offset their 
short positions, able to benefit 
only in rising or backwardated 
(spot price > forward price) 
markets; transparent positions. 
Position taking 
behaviour 
React to changes in 
commodity market 
fundamentals (supply, 
demand, inventories); 
mostly trade in one or 
two commodities of 
which they have 
intimate knowledge; 
leveraged positions 
Some (e.g., hedge funds) 
conduct research on commodity-
market fundamentals and thus 
react to changes in those 
fundamentals. Others (e.g., 
commodity trading advisers) 
mostly use statistical analyses 
(trend identification and 
extrapolation, automatic 
computerized trading), which 
extract information from price 
movements.  They thereby risk 
misinterpreting noise trader 
position taking for genuine price 
information, engaging in herd 
behaviour and causing snowball 
effects; leveraged positions. 
Not interested in fundamentals of 
specific commodity markets but 
may have views on commodities 
as a whole; relative size of 
positions in individual 
commodities determined by an 
index weighting formula; 
idiosyncratic position taking such 
as rolling at predetermined dates; 
position changes are relatively 
easy to predict; fully 
collateralized positions 
Impact on 
liquidity 
Improve liquidity Active, large positions can 
improve liquidity and make 
hedging easier for large 
commercial users.  In periods of 
rapid and sharp price changes, 
large positions are a “liquidity 
sponge”, making it difficult for 
hedgers with commercial 
interests to place orders 
Passive, large positions act as a 
“liquidity sponge” 
Reaction to 
sharp price 
changes 
May be taken by 
surprise if price 
changes are unrelated 
to fundamentals; can 
be forced out of the 
market if they lack 
liquidity to meet 
margin calls triggered 
by sharp price 
increases. 
Taking and closing positions are 
often automatically triggered by 
computer programs; risk of 
causing a snowball effect 
Different price developments for 
individuals commodities require 
decompositions of relative 
investment positions to preserve 
a predetermined index weight 
pattern; sharp price declines may 
cause disinvestment 
Reaction to 
changes on 
other markets 
Operative only in 
commodity markets; 
normally concentrate 
on one or a few 
Operate across different asset 
classes.  Commodities tend to 
have a fixed weight in managed 
fund portfolios, so that price 
Operate across different asset 
classes.  Potentially strong links 
between commodity futures 
activity and development on 
19 
 
commodities, and thus 
react little to 
developments in other 
markets 
movements in other markets can 
lead to position changes in 
commodity markets 
equity and bond markets, in two 
ways: a) risk-return combinations 
in other asset classes can become 
more attractive, causing a 
withdrawal from commodity 
markets; b)margin calls on other 
investments can trigger closing 
of positions in commodity and 
accelerate contagion across asset 
classes 
Classification 
in CFTC 
Commitment 
of Traders 
Reports 
Non-commercial user 
category 
Mostly in non-commercial user 
category 
Mostly in commercial user 
category 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2009. 
 
Table 2: Causes/Policies are impacted on Speculative Months 
 
Year Name of 
the Months 
Policies/Causes/Remarks 
2007 February The government ordered a delisting of futures contracts in February 2007 for 
commodities like urad, tur, wheat and rice with a suspicion that futures trading 
in these commodities had been contributing to the rise in their domestic spot 
prices. Reversing the mood, sugar, oil, rice and potato were added to the list in 
2007. 
November Forward Markets Commission, on 19
th
  October 2007, directed the National 
Exchanges to impose margin on spread positions
24
  
2008 March The Commission has approved for change in trade timings by 45 minutes 
during the period from 4
th
 March to 20
th
 March, 2008 due to „Sun Outage‟ 
i.e.upto 17:45 hours during weekdays and 14:45 hours on Saturdays. 
Policy on Foreign Investment in commodity exchanges
25
 
                                                 
24 With the following guidelines: (i) At least one-third of the Initial Margin (inclusive of Exposure and Volatility 
margin) will be charged on both the legs of the calendar spread. Such benefit will be given only if there is positive 
correlation in the prices of the months under consideration and the far month contracts are sufficiently liquid. (ii) No 
benefit of calendar spread will be given in the case of additional and special margins. (iii) As far as (i) above is 
concerned, the Exchanges are free to charge margins higher than the minimum specified depending upon their risk 
perceptions 
25
 The Commission has conveyed to all the exchanges the policy on foreign investment in commodity exchanges 
approved by the Government, vide Press Note No.2 (2008) issued by the Department of Industrial Policy and 
Promotion dated 12
th
 March, 2008, as follows: (a) Overall foreign investment in a Commodity Futures Exchange 
shall be limited to 49%. FII component will be capped at 23% and FDI component at 26%. (b) FII  purchases will be 
restricted to secondary market only; (c) No single entity shall hold more than 5 % equity; (d) FDI will be allowed 
with specific prior approval of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB); and (e) FIIs shall not seek and will 
not get any representation on the Board of Directors of the Commodity Exchanges. The instructions regarding the 
bringing down the existing FDI / FII to the prescribed level so as to be in alignment with the aforesaid policy, 
wherever applicable, will be issued in due course.  
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July The Commission, on the 14th May 2008, issued guidelines for grant of 
recognition to new Commodity Exchanges under the provisions of the FCRA, 
1952 and gave a Permission for launching new contracts in commodities was 
granted to the Exchanges and In-principle approval was granted on 17
th
 July 
2008 to MMTC & India Bulls Financial Services Ltd, for setting up of 
Nationwide Multi Commodity Exchange in NCR (Gurgaon). 
October The Commission has granted permission to National Multy Commodity 
Exchange of India Ltd., Ahmedabad, on 27
th
 August, 2008 to replace the 
Coffee Robusta Cherry AB contract with Robusta Cherry Estate Pounded 
(REP) Bulk. Permission for launching new contracts in the commodities was 
granted to the Exchanges 
November Permission for launching new contracts in the commodities was granted to the 
Exchanges. During the period from 17.11.2008 to 29.11.2008, 22 commodities 
were traded at the Exchange. Out of these, Gold, Crude Oil & Silver had the 
highest volumes of trade. The Commission, on 31
st
  November, 2008, has 
revised the daily price limits in respect of following 18 commodities 
2009 April The Commission, on 16
th
 March, 2009, permitted the NCDEX to accredit the 
warehouses of producers/ processors/ similar participants within 50 km of the 
municipal limits of the delivery centers to enable such participants to deliver 
the goods on the Exchange platform
26
 
June Permission for launching contracts in the commodities was granted to the 
Exchanges 
July Permission for launching contracts in the commodities was granted to the 
Exchanges 
                                                 
26
 This facility was also extended in respect of bulk commodities which have annual production base of not less than 
one million tons in India. Further, the Commission allowed the Exchange to accredit the warehouses of producers / 
processor / similar participants located within a radius of additional 100 km beyond the 50 km radius from the 
municipal limits at present stipulated for the accredited warehouses at the delivery centres. Such warehouses can 
thus be located within a radius of 150 km of the municipal limits of the delivery centre and are to be called as 
“Satellite Warehouses”. Each Satellite Warehouse will act as an extension for feeding an already existing accredited 
warehouse at the delivery centre and are subject to the following conditions: (a) The commodity lying in satellite 
warehouses, as assayed/dematted, as is the practice in the existing accredited warehouses, becomes „Stocks available 
for delivery‟. The demat credit for goods lying in such warehouses will be for the main accredited warehouse to 
which the said accredited warehouse is a satellite warehouse. (b) The “Stocks available for delivery” in the Satellite 
Warehouses shall remain physically segregated and can not be exchanged/replaced with other stocks of the same 
commodity in the warehouse (c) The goods may remain in the “Satellite Warehouses” until they are marked for 
delivery. The said goods would be arranged to be transported by the seller at his cost, including transportation 
charges, incidental costs like handling at both the ends, applicable taxes, octroi, etc., through the Warehouse Service 
Provider, to the main accredited warehouse at the delivery centre to which it is linked. Physical delivery would be 
effected from such main warehouses. (d) The Exchange should treat these warehouses at par with other Exchange-
accredited warehouses and all the systems, such as clearing, pay in, pay-out, assaying etc. remain the same. (e) The 
Exchange takes the responsibility for quality assurance in the goods stored in the said warehouses and ensures 
delivery to the satisfaction of the buyers. (f) The Exchange puts in place a strict supervisory mechanism in place, so 
that credibility of these warehouses is not compromised in the eyes of the market participants. (g) The accreditation 
of such satellite warehouses should be initiated only in the case of bulk commodities, i.e. with an annual production 
base of not less than one million tonnes in India, for the purposes of this circular. (h) Stocks of participants other 
than the person(s) whose warehouse has been accredited as satellite warehouse will not be allowed to be delivered in 
the satellite warehouses. 
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August Permission for launching contracts in the commodities was granted to the 
Exchanges 
September The Commission, on 18
th
  September, 2009, has directed  all Nation wide Multi 
Commodity Exchanges that they may decide upon the suspension of the trading 
during „Sun Outage‟ taking into consideration the connectivity used by the 
Exchange and its members during the period from 22
nd
  September 2009 to 9
th
  
October 2009 (both days inclusive).  However, there would be no extension of 
the trade timings beyond normal timings during that period.    
October The Commission, on 5
th
 October 2009, has permitted the extension in evening 
trade timings at Nationwide Multi Commodity Exchanges from the existing 
11:30 pm to 11:55 pm during the period from 2
nd
  November 2009 to 13
th
 
March 2010 (both days inclusive) in respect of the permitted international 
referenceable commodities due to the US Daylight Saving Time.    
 
The Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Government 
of India, on 9
th
  October 2009, has granted recognition to M/s. Indian 
Commodity Exchange Limited (ICEX), NCR, Gurgaon, on permanent basis in 
respect of forward contracts in all the commodities in which Section 15 is 
applicable and the commodities to which neither Section 17 nor Section 15 of 
FC(R) Act, 1952 is applicable, with prior permission of the FMC
27
.     
November Permission for launching contracts in the commodities was granted to the 
Exchanges
28
 
December The Commission, on 7
th
 December, 2009 has issued following instructions to 
National Exchanges
29
 
2010 January The Commission, on 8
th
 January 2010, has extended the permission for hedge 
positions exemptions to the Tinna Oil and Chemicals Ltd. and ITC Limited in 
Soybean contracts till 31
st
  March 2010. 
                                                 
27
 At present, the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) do not cover the 
intermediaries of the Commodity Markets. As large valued transactions also take place in the commodity market, 
the Commission felt that a proper policy framework on anti-money laundering measures is required to be put in 
place. The Commission has, therefore, taken up the matter with the Finance Ministry through the Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs for coverage of intermediaries of the commodity markets under the PMLA. As per the suggestion 
of the Finance Ministry, guidelines for the intermediaries in the commodity markets have been issued the National 
Exchanges on 30
th
 October 2009 for further necessary action. 
28
 The Forward Markets Commission, in pursuance of Section 14A / 14B of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 
1952 (74 of 1952) (hereinafter referred to as the ACT), hereby grants Certificate of Registration to the Indian 
Commodity Exchange Limited (ICEX), New Delhi a recognized association u/s 6 of the ACT, on a permanent basis 
for conducting forward trading in the Commodities to which neither Section 17 nor Section 15 of the ACT is 
applicable. The Commission, on 21
st
 November 2009, has given its approval to the Bye-laws, Rules of the new 
multi-commodity exchange, Indian Commodity Exchange (ICEX). 
29
 The Commission, on 7
th
 December, 2009 has issued following instructions to National Exchanges in respect of 
dealing with inactive clients:   (i)  „An Inactive Client‟ would be one who has not executed any trade during the last 
six months.  (ii) The member should keep close watch on the accounts of inactive clients. (iii) The members should 
not accept trades in these accounts without specific written request from the client to  re-open those accounts along 
with compliance of all required formalities of KYC. (iv) After receipt of written request from the client and 
fulfillment of requirements of KYC, the member may   execute his orders with the same client code, i.e., the client 
code issued earlier by the member to the concerned client.  (v)  If trade takes place in such inactive accounts without 
following the above procedure, the same would be treated as members‟ proprietary trade for all practical purposes.  
(vi)  Such members will be liable for penal action by the Exchange/FMC for any misuse of client UCC.  
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The Commission, on 8
th
  January 2010, has permitted the Early Delivery 
System in Soybean (for MCX) / Soy Oil (for NMCE) contracts expiring in 
January 2010 and onwards. 
March The Commission, on 26
th
  February, 2010, has approved the following transfers 
of equity shares of MCX
30
 
 
The Commission, on 3
rd
  March 2010, has revised the open position limits for 
aggregate and near month futures contract of Wheat 
 
The Commission, on 5
th
  March,2010, has approved the transfer of 1,323,529 
equity shares of Rs. 5 each comprising of 1.622 % of the total equity capital of 
MCX from Fidelity Funds - India Focus Limited acting through FIL Investment 
Management (Hong Kong) Limited to Intel Capital (Mauritius) Limited.    
 
The Commission, on 12
th
 March, 2010, has permitted the Indian Commodity 
Exchange Limited (ICEX) to levy transaction charges at the rate of Re. 1/- per 
Rs.1, 00,000/- turnover of the members for a further period of three months, 
i.e., upto 26th May 2010. 
 
                                                 
30
 The Commission, on 26
th
  February, 2010, has approved the following transfers of equity shares of MCX: (a) 
transfer of 1,655,476 Equity Shares of MCX (2.03% of the total Equity Capital) from Fid Funds (Mauritius) Limited 
Mauritius to M/s. Passport India Investments (Mauritius) Ltd., Mauritius, (b) transfer of 3,907,540 Equity Shares of 
MCX (4.79% of the total Equity Capital) from M/s. Citigroup Strategic Holdings Mauritius Ltd., to M/s. Aginyx 
Enterprises Limited, Cyprus. 
 
